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Meeting of Guatemalan Group
Wednesday, June 23, 1954

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Present: Holland, Atwood, Burrows, Jamison, Sanders, Wieland, Herron, Sparks, Woodward, Warren, Holcomb, Leddy, Pearson, Col. Clark, Dreier

1. Security Council Action

(a) Lodge informed Holland that the British and French representatives to the Security Council are prepared to go along with a Soviet proposal that the Council send peace observers to Central America. Lodge believed that he would have to go along unless an OAS organization announced that it was planning to send observers.

(b) Holland later during the meeting called Lodge and told him the following: 1) our plans for action in the IAFC, which, if successful, would mean that the body would propose to send peace observers; 2) in his statement proposing the Guatemalan request for further Security Council action he could say that this is a dispute involving charges of Guatemala on the one hand and denials by Nicaragua and Honduras on the other hand, that this dispute was being handled by an inter-American organization just as it should be, that Nicaragua and Honduras would accept observers from an inter-American organization but not from the Security Council where the Soviet veto was used to prevent reference of the Guatemalan charges to the OAS; 3) as a second part of his statement before the Council, he should emphasize that there is another far more fundamental problem, namely, the attempts by international communism to penetrate the Western Hemisphere. This problem also is under study in the OAS.

2. Preparations for IAFC Meeting

Since the IAFC was meeting this afternoon and since Lodge had made his call upon arming the British and French attitude toward the peace observer proposal, it was necessary to plan the best course of action. The following actions were decided:

(a) Since Valle had, without instruction, sent a note to the IAFC requesting that the Guatemalan charges be taken up, Holland called Willauer to tell him to persuade the Honduran Foreign Minister 1) to give Valle the instructions backing up the note which he had left with the IAFC and 2) to call Bustamante direct concerning the Honduran position. Holland placed a call later to have Willauer ask the Foreign Minister to instruct Valle to ask that peace observers be sent by the IAFC.

(b) Holland

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(b) Holland called Sevilla-Sacasa and got him to agree to a plan whereby after making the statement which he had already ~~said~~ was prepared he would make request that peace observers be sent to all three countries; to indicate that his country was always prepared to receive observers from an OAS organization but that he would oppose observers from the Security Council because of the Soviet veto; suggest that the Committee invite the three countries to send delegates to discuss the arrangements for the peace observation mission.

(c) Dreier was to talk with the Argentine, Mexican, Brazilian and Cuban representatives to the IAPC to persuade them to respond favorably to the request by Nicaragua and Honduras for peace observers and to say that they would recommend that their governments approve this proposal.

(d) Dreier was to persuade the Cuban representative to propose that the investigation begin with Guatemala.

(e) Burrows was to help Valle draft a note to the Committee complaining of the bombing of Honduran territory by Guatemala and also to see that he got in touch with Sevilla-Sacasa.

3. Draft Resolution

Secretary Dulles would not approve sending notes to the Foreign Ministers in an effort to get their agreement in advance that no changes would be made in the draft resolution without the unanimous approval of the sponsoring group. He indicated that it would damage his prestige if some of these countries did not accept. Consequently, it was decided to send a message to each of our Ambassadors instructing them to obtain the oral agreement of the Foreign Minister to our proposal to be confirmed at a later date in writing. When a total of fourteen countries, including ourselves, have approved this proposal the meeting will be called.

4. U.S. Line if Arms Fails

(a) Holland observed that the messages coming in from all over Latin America bear out Herter's observation at the previous meeting that the revolution and particularly its failure would result in greatly lowered prestige for the U.S. in Latin America. Guatemala is more than ever the underdog and hence has very great appeal to all Latin Americans.

(b) As a general course of action we should take all steps possible to minimize the Guatemalan underdog position and we should also do everything possible to take the steam surrounding the revolution off the U.S.

(c) The primary immediate actions discussed at this meeting were a) preparation for the IAPC meeting and b) advice to Lodge on the Security Council meeting, both of which were discussed above.

"A" correspondence